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Abstract
How intelligent is robot A compared with robot B? And how intelligent are robots A and B compared with
animals (or plants) X and Y? These are both interesting and deeply challenging questions. In this paper we
address the question "how intelligent is your intelligent robot?" by proposing that embodied intelligence
emerges from the interaction and integration of four different and distinct kinds of intelligence. We then
suggest a simple diagrammatic representation on which these kinds of intelligence are shown as four axes in
a star diagram. A crude qualitative comparison of the intelligence graphs of animals and robots both exposes
and helps to explain the chronic intelligence deficit of intelligent robots. Finally we examine the options for
determining numerical values for the four kinds of intelligence in an effort to move toward a quantifiable
intelligence vector.
I. Introduction
Benchmarking the performance of robotsis notoriously difficult, even when com-paring similar robots undertaking the
same task under controlled conditions [13]. But
if we want to ask a different question: "how
intelligent is any given robot?" we face a much
bigger challenge, especially if we want to posi-
tion robot intelligence within the spectrum of
animal (or more generally) natural intelligence.
The first challenge is that there is no satisfac-
tory pan-species definition of intelligence, i.e.
one that we could apply to all animals as well
as robots. The second is that intelligence is not
one thing that animals or robots have more or
less of.
This paper will attempt to make headway
in addressing the problem of assessing robot
intelligence in several ways. First, we propose
four categories of intelligence: morphological
intelligence, swarm intelligence, individual in-
telligence and social intelligence. We then sug-
gest a simple diagrammatic representation on
which these kinds of intelligence are shown
as four axes in a star diagram. Guessing at
relative values for certain animals and robots
and superimposing these immediately and sur-
prisingly reveals why present day robot intel-
ligence falls so far behind animal intelligence.
The paper then examines the options for de-
termining numerical values for the four kinds
of intelligence, in an effort to move toward a
quantifiable intelligence vector.
II. Kinds of Intelligence
How do we define intelligence? Is is as sim-
ple as ‘doing the right thing at the right time’
or is learning (or adaptation) so fundamental
that any definition must encompass learning?
Legg and Hutter [18] collected 70 different def-
initions for intelligence, which they distilled
into “Intelligence measures an agent’s ability
to achieve goals in a wide range of environ-
ments"; they note that the ability to learn or
adapt is implicit in this definition.
In this paper we sidestep the thorny prob-
lem of coming up with a singular definition
of intelligence by proposing that embodied
intelligence inter alia emerges from the inter-
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action and integration of four different and
distinct kinds of intelligence. These are mor-
phological intelligence and swarm intelligence,
which fall upon one axis which we might label
body/bodies, and individual and social intel-
ligence that we might label adaptation. These
four kinds of intelligence are defined as fol-
lows.
i. Morphological Intelligence
This is the kind of intelligence that a physical
body confers to its owner. The idea that a body
has some inherent intelligence may seem odd,
but is closely related to the notion of morpho-
logical computation; which has been defined as
“a term which captures conceptually the obser-
vation that biological systems take advantage
of their morphology to conduct computations
needed for a successful interaction with their
environments" [15]. Following Pfeifer and Iida
[25] let us define morphological Intelligence as
the physical behaviour that emerges from the
interaction of body, its control system and the
environment. The best way to illustrate mor-
phological intelligence is with simple robots
that are notably unintelligent. David Buckley’s
minimal walking robot TechFoot, for example,
uses only 5 servomotors but achieves bipedal
locomotion by exploiting both natural oscilla-
tions and energy storage in the leg and hip
structure to achieve dynamically stable walk-
ing [7]. For another example consider the So-
larbot, a simple Braitenberg machine [4] with
just two solar panels and two motors, in which
the left hand solar sensor drives the right hand
motor, and vice versa. Despite having no com-
putational control, Solarbot demonstrates sur-
prisingly rich behaviours [32, p. 43]. A third
and even more dramatic example is the Jeager-
Lipson coffee balloon gripper [5]. A gripper
based on a balloon filled with coffee grounds,
which exploits the phase transition from fluid
to solid when the air is evacuated from the grip-
per. A wonderful example of soft robotics, the
Jaeger-Lipson gripper shows huge versatility
in its ability to reliably grip a wide range of ob-
jects yet requires none of the morphological or
control complexity of robot grippers modelled
on the human hand.
ii. Swarm Intelligence
Swarm Intelligence describes the collective,
self-organised behaviour we observe in ani-
mals that swarm, shoal, flock or herd, or - more
dramatically - build complex nest structures
such as ants, bees, or termite mounds. Swarm
intelligence is an emergent property of the col-
lective that results from the local interactions
of the individuals with each other and with
their environment [11]. The individuals of the
swarm act autonomously on the basis of local
sensing and local communications only, and
importantly there is no command and control
hierarchy in a swarm - no ‘brain’ ant in an
ant colony - instead control is completely dis-
tributed and decentralised.
Swarm robotics is an effort to create swarms
of robots in which the desired collective be-
haviours emerge from the local interactions
between individual robots and their environ-
ment [26]. Several collective behaviours have
been successfully demonstrated in the labo-
ratory, including flocking, foraging [21], col-
lective transport [14] and collective construc-
tion [20],[29]. Indeed foraging is a canonical
problem in swarm robotics, since foraging is a
metaphor for many potential real world appli-
cations of robot swarms [30].
iii. Individual Intelligence
Individual intelligence is defined here as the
ability to both respond (instinctively) to stimuli
and, optionally, learn new – or adapt existing –
behaviours through, typically, a process of trial
and error. The instinctive component of indi-
vidual intelligence is hard wired; in plants and
animals it is evolved or, in robots, either hand
designed or artificially evolved. If a learned
component is present the actual learning mech-
anism is not important here, except that it must
be the individual that learns in its own lifetime,
without the help of another individual.
Dennett proposes an elegant conceptual
model of adaptation in his Tower of Gener-
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ate and Test [10]. Dennett argues that adap-
tation requires actions (in response to some
stimulus) to be generated and tested by an an-
imal, and classifies animals according to the
mechanism employed. Dennett’s tower is set
of conceptual creatures each one of which is
successively more capable of reacting to (and
hence surviving in) the world through having
more sophisticated strategies for ‘generating
and testing’ hypotheses about how to react.
On the first floor of Dennett’s tower are Dar-
winian creatures, which have only natural se-
lection as the generate and test mechanism, so
variation and selection is the only way that
Darwinian creatures can adapt – individuals
cannot. On the second floor are Skinnerian
creatures, which can learn but only by literally
generating and testing all different possible ac-
tions then reinforcing the successful behaviour.
On the third floor of the tower are Popperian
creatures which have the additional ability to
internally model the possible actions so that
some (the bad ones) are rejected before they
are tried out for real. Like the Tower of Hanoi
each successive storey is smaller (a sub-set) of
the storey below, thus only a sub-set of Dar-
winian creatures are Skinnerian and so on. In
the scheme of this paper we regard Dennett’s
Darwinian, Skinnerian and Popperians crea-
tures as all exhibiting individual intelligence.
There are many robots with individual in-
telligence of different types; examples include
reactive behaviours such as obstacle avoidance
which has been designed by hand [3], or artifi-
cially evolved [1]. There are also many exam-
ples of robots capable of individual learning:
one important class of learning algorithm al-
lows a robot to simultaneously localise itself
within its environment while building a map
of that environment (SLAM) [28], another is
reinforcement learning (RL), for a survey see
[17].
iv. Social Intelligence
Social intelligence is the kind of intelligence
that allows animals or robots to learn from
each other. This might be through imitation
or instruction. In imitation a new behaviour
is acquired by the social learner observing an-
other’s behaviour then transforming those ob-
servations into corresponding actions and re-
sponses. With or without the active coopera-
tion of the demonstrator, imitation is a complex
process which requires cognitive mechanisms
to solve the so called correspondence prob-
lem [23]; how best to match observed sense
data with corresponding motor actions. So-
cial learning through instruction is even more
complex since it requires a teacher to explain
a behaviour using shared symbols, and the
learner to properly interpret and assimilate
those instructions.
Returning to Dennett’s tower of generate and
test, on the fourth floor we find Gregorian crea-
tures. These are tool makers including - impor-
tantly - mind tools like language, which means
that individuals no longer have to generate
and test all possible hypotheses since others
have done so already and can pass on that
knowledge. Gregorian creatures are tool mak-
ers, of both physical tools (like scissors) and
mind-tools (like language and mathematics),
and Dennett suggests that these tools are ‘in-
telligence amplifiers’. Certainly they give Gre-
gorian creatures a significant advantage over
Popperians, because they have the benefit of
the shared experience of others, expressed ei-
ther through using the tools they have made or
refined or, more directly, through their knowl-
edge or instructions as spoken or written.
The study of imitation and social learning in
robots, humans and animals has received cross-
disciplinary attention [24]. Not surprisingly
much attention has been given to the problem
of humanoid robots imitating humans, since
this presents a way of programming a robot
by demonstration (PbD) rather than coding
[22], [2]. There has been less work in robot-
robot imitation. The earliest is perhaps the
work of Hayes and Demiris which describes
an approach with one (pre-programmed) robot
finding its way through a maze and another
following it and observing its actions (turns).
The following (learner) robot then associates
each observed action with its own – time de-
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layed – perception of the environment and
hence learns how to navigate the maze, by
imitation [16]. More recent work demonstrates
embodied behavioral evolution in a group of
robots through repeated cycles of imperfect
robot-robot imitation, in which the process of
noisy imitation introduces variations which, in
turn, introduce behavioural novelty [31].
III. A map of intelligence
Let us now put these four kinds of intelligence
together as two axes, in Fig. 1. We place mor-
phological and swarm intelligence on the verti-
cal body/bodies axis and individual and social
intelligence on the horizontal adaptation axis.
Figure 1. The axes of intelligence
Fig. 2 attempts a comparison of animal and
plant intelligence. We suppose a crocodile to
exhibit morphological and individual intelli-
gence, and a limited amount of social intelli-
gence, but no swarm intelligence - as far as
we know crocodiles do not shoal or herd. In
contrast ants have no social intelligence (as far
as we know), but considerable swarm intel-
ligence, and somewhat more morphological
intelligence than a crocodile, since its body
is more complex; ants also exhibit some indi-
vidual intelligence, including simple learning.
Plants certainly exhibit morphological intelli-
gence as well as some elements of swarm intel-
ligence [8].
Figure 2. Comparing animal and plant intelli-
gence
If we now add humans to this comparison,
in Fig. 3, we see that humans exhibit huge
levels of individual and social intelligence, pre-
sumably more than any other known animal.
But a human’s morphological intelligence is
arguably somewhat lower than an ant’s, and
while humans do exhibit a degree of swarm
intelligence – as crowd behaviour – this is at
a much lower level of significance than social
insects.
Figure 3. Comparing human and animal intel-
ligence
Of course the intelligence maps represented
by the star diagrams of Figs 2 and 3 are crude
guesses; the simple fact is that we cannot as-
sign values to the levels of each of our four cat-
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egories of intelligence, any better than we can
guess the IQ of a crocodile. Nor can we have
any confidence in the relative values shown
here (does a crocodile really have half the in-
dividual intelligence of a human?): an obser-
vation that leads to the suggestion that these
axes might be better constructed as logarithmic
scales.
These star diagrams do, however, have ex-
planatory value. Recalling our working defini-
tion of intelligence as an emergent property of
the interaction and integration of four different
and distinct kinds of intelligence, the star dia-
grams serve to illuminate clear deficits as well
as relative strengths in the kinds of intelligence
apparently demonstrated by living organisms.
Now let us turn to the question of how
robots measure up within this scheme. Fig.
4 attempts a similar estimation of the relative
levels of our four kinds of intelligence for a
small number of exemplar robots. Of course
we can be more confident of the kinds of intelli-
gence expressed by these robots since they are
designed (or, in one case, evolved) artefacts, al-
though the relative levels of intelligence shown
in fig. 4 remain guesses.
Figure 4. How do robots measure up?
Starting on the bottom left is a swarm of
e-puck robots exhibiting perhaps the simplest
of swarm behaviours: flocking. With only 2
wheels these robots are morphologically very
simple and therefore merit no score for mor-
phological intelligence, but since each robot is
individually capable of simple obstacle avoid-
ance they do show a very low level of individ-
ual intelligence – hence the orange graph in fig.
4. The illustration on the bottom right shows
one of the few examples of robots that exhibit
both individual (reinforcement) learning – in
this case learning how to reach a goal position
in the arena – and social learning – periodi-
cally each robot will leave its arena and ob-
serve the other to imitate its behaviour; we call
this imitation-enhanced reinforcement learn-
ing [12]. The intelligence graph for the e-puck
robots executing these behaviours is shown in
green and extends across the individual and
social intelligence axes.
In the top right of fig. 4 we see the Golem
robot, notable because both its body shape and
(artificial neural network) controller are artifi-
cially evolved for locomotion with linear actu-
ators which exploit frictional forces [19]. Its
intelligence graph is shown in purple with a
reasonable score for morphological intelligence
and a small score for individual intelligence (al-
though whether this robot merits any score at
all for individual intelligence is moot - since the
ANN which coordinates its actuators is an in-
tegral and necessary part of its morphological
intelligence). In the top left of fig. 4 is a Mars
rover, included here because it exhibits a high
level of morphological intelligence (shown in
yellow) thanks to the ingenious design of its
rocker-bogey mounted wheels. These give the
rover the ability to cross rough terrain, includ-
ing modestly sized rocks, without explicit con-
trol, since the arrangement of wheels and bo-
geys simply deforms to accommodate those
obstacles.
Finally, as a topical example, we consider
the question: how intelligent is a driverless
car? Morphologically the driverless car shown
in fig. 4 is very simple indeed – certainly much
simpler than the Mars rover and Golem robot
– with four wheels and standard front-wheel
Ackermann steering. However, in the intel-
ligence graph (shown in blue) we acknowl-
edge that the tyres fitted to the driverless cars’
wheels, together with its suspension, afford the
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car some ability to deal with uneven road sur-
faces without explicit control. The driverless
car’s autopilot provides it with a considerable
degree of individual intelligence in managing
the complexity of safe autonomous driving –
even in favourable traffic and weather condi-
tions; this almost certainly makes the driverless
car one of the most (individually) intelligent
robots to date.
IV. Why Intelligent Robots are
not very
Our intuition leads us to the view that, in gen-
eral, the intelligence of intelligent robots falls
far short of that of most animals. Fig. 4 exposes
at least one of the reasons for this intelligence
gap: none of the intelligence graphs for the
exemplar robots score on more than two axes,
whereas all of the exemplar animals in fig. 3
score on at least three axes. Of course neither
figs. 3 or 4 represent a comprehensive survey,
but nevertheless we are drawn to the provi-
sional conclusion that robots typically exhibit
some limited morphological intelligence plus
some limited form of one of the other kinds
of intelligence (the example of e-puck robots
demonstrating imitation-enhanced reinforce-
ment learning [12] is a rare exception). Why
limited? It only needs a moment’s reflection to
appreciate that, firstly, the level of morphologi-
cal sophistication demonstrated in robots falls
far below that of most organisms and, secondly,
that the scope and sophistication of the singu-
lar kinds of intelligence exhibited by robots is
very narrow.
In order to make a living all animals must
and do successfully forage or hunt for food,
evade predators and find a mate, while some
build nests, nurture young, construct social
hierarchies and/or seasonally migrate; some
make and use tools. No robot demonstrates
even a small fraction of these basic survival
skills. The fact that the levels of intelligence
in the graphs of fig. 4 are so chronically low
suggests that we should imagine magnifying
the region of fig. 3 close to the origin in its cen-
tre in order to make a meaningful comparison
between the two figures.
Let us now speculate on how we might con-
struct more accurate quantitative assessments
of the four kinds of intelligence in order to
construct an intelligence vector for any given
intelligent agent. At first this might appear to
be a hopeless endeavour (and for all but the
simplest animals it may well be). But one thing
all animals and autonomous robots have in
common is action-selection [27]: all autonomous
agents must, from time to time, choose their
next action – normally in response to some
sensory stimulus – from a pool of next possi-
ble actions. This observation suggests a crude
metric: we could simply count the number
of next possible actions. For robots at least
obtaining such a measure should be feasible.
This suggestion immediately raises a number
of difficult questions including, first, how do
we define a unit of action: is it low-level such
as ‘actuate left motor’, mid-level like ‘avoid
obstacle’ or the higher-level ‘navigate safely
to battery recharging station’? Second, how
would such actions be identified for the cate-
gory of morphological intelligence, and third,
how do we define discrete emergent swarm
behaviours (flocking, foraging, etc)?
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a new ap-
proach to addressing the question: how in-
telligent are intelligent robots, by proposing
that intelligence emerges from the interaction
and integration of four kinds of intelligence:
morphological, swarm, individual and social.
By placing these four kinds of intelligence in a
map (star diagram) we can guess a set of intelli-
gence graphs for different animals (and plants)
and exemplar robots. These very approximate
graphs expose the chronic intelligence deficit
of (intelligent) robots when compared with an-
imals, revealing in particular the fact that most
robots demonstrate only two kinds of intelli-
gence (morphological plus one other) in stark
contrast with animals which typically exhibit
high levels of both morphological intelligence
and two or three other kinds of intelligence.
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Why is this? One is the obvious conclusion
that the development of intelligent robots is an
immature science: an early work-in-progress.
Another is that labs typically focus their re-
search on one kind of intelligence; few if any
are actively pursuing the hard task of integrat-
ing all kinds of intelligence in a single robot –
something Dennett [9] and Brooks [6] describe
as “building the whole iguana”.
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